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ABSTRACT
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES CASE LAW ON
TODAY’S MILITARY HUNGER STRIKE DOCTRINE
Adrian J. Mora. (Sponsored by John H. Warner, Department of History of Medicine,
Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT).
HYPOTHESIS/AIMS: In the Global War on Terror (GWOT), hunger strikes by detainees in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba have been managed by military physicians through force feedings. This thesis answers the
question of how did the United States justify its current practice of force feeding prisoners against
prevailing medical ethics? The author hypothesizes that U.S. case law history of approximately 1979 to
1997 enabled the current military doctrine to force feed international detainees in GWOT.
METHODS: A qualitative and comprehensive review of the relevant literature was undertaken. The
sources used for conclusive analysis included press releases, ethics commentary, law reviews, medical
association declarations, military law, international law, domestic law, court cases, judicial reviews,
military manuals, and federal prison manuals.
RESULTS: The majority of decided United States court cases from the late 1970’s through the mid 1990’s
upheld that the State may force feed a competent prisoner on a hunger strike and override the patient’s right
to refuse treatment and right to privacy. The U.S. military’s current hunger strike policy follows similar
opinion and procedural language established from the aforementioned case law history.
CONCLUSION: The preponderance of established rulings suggests that approximately 20 years prior to the
hunger strikes of Guantanamo Bay in GWOT, the United States justified force feeding fasting prisoners.
This national acceptance influenced the Department of Defense’s stance on detainee hunger strikes. The
military’s procedural guidelines follow current federal prison regulations. Also, the official opinions by the
military cite the federal prison system, federal law, and court language applied by consenting rulings. Key
international jurisdictions and the bioethics community, including the United Nations, have ruled to uphold
a hunger striker’s right to refuse nutrition. The U.S. military’s refusal to align with prevailing ethics also
demonstrates the larger significance of U.S. case law to validate today’s U.S. military doctrine. As such,
the author suggests avenues of bioethics reform for military medicine.
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INTRODUCTION
As a reaction to the Soviet Union’s use of psychiatrists to persecute political
dissenters, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) joined The Hastings Center, a
bioethics institute, to address the broad issue of conflicting loyalties in medical practice
during a five day conference in 1977 (1). The conference may be construed as the first
formal attempt to categorize the professional conflicts in military medicine. In the
published discussions, Arlene Kaplan Daniels, an occupational sociologist, described the
concept of “mixed agency” to expose the dual loyalty dilemmas of military psychiatrists
serving in the Vietnam War (1). Daniels remarked that “the difficulties facing
[physicians] in understanding their role (as agents of social control) when they make
decisions for institutions are compounded by their place in medicine” (1). Even before
Vietnam, in the mid-19th century, the newborn American Medical Association (AMA)
formally pledged allegiance to the Union by donating a commemorative stone to the
Washington Monument; the stone, inspired by Anne-Louis Girodet de Roucy-Trioson’s
Hippocrates Refuses the Gifts of Artaxerxes, implies that physicians’ dual loyalty
commitments originated during Hippocrates’ time (Figure 1) (2).
As a general concept, mixed agency revolves around the obligations of a
professional to their institution versus the expectations of the served individual. Mixed
agency arises in the civilian medical realm within the context of providers and their
pressures from prisons, hospitals, pharmaceutical firms, and insurance companies (3, 4).
Also, at times, epidemiological mandates of forensic medicine, child welfare, and
communicable diseases force physicians to subjugate the patient (3, 4). Yet, the loyalty of
the military physician to their branch of service reaches a greater degree of importance, in
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that, this conflict occurs in higher frequency during combat with consequences of
military significance (3).
The indoctrination of service members and medical personnel includes this sobering
realization of military consequences. For example, Edmund Howe, a military bioethicist
and lecturer at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS),
described the higher stakes found in the military with the classic scenario of returning the
soldier to the front lines:
If increasing numbers of soldiers are excused from duty by feigning illness, the
ability of the military to accomplish its mission will be diminished. It is even
possible that the war could be lost, and that society that depends on its military
could be destroyed. In that even the number of civilians killed may be in the
millions. (4)
Perhaps, Howe’s scenario may be far-reaching but it serves a clear illustration that the
medical officer impacts goals of military necessity. Such goals include war strategy,
fighting strength, counterinsurgency operations, and intelligence gathering to protect
society (4).
Bioethicists from the civilian and military realms analyze and arrive at conclusions
on the mixed agency of military physicians. Two opposing arguments warrant merit. One
states that, because of the dual loyalty of the military physician, the very position of the
military medical officer contradicts patient-centered medical care (5). The other camp,
comprised of military physicians and officials, supports the military officer as the best
solution to serve as the primary caregiver during combat (6).
In regards to the inherent nature of mixed agency, health law and civilian
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bioethicists oppose the external commitments of the military medical officer. In the
textbook Military Medical Ethics provided to medical students at USUHS, Victor W.
Sidel and Howard B. Levy argue that the dual loyalty of the military physician renders
this position ethically unjustifiable (5). Sidel and Levy speak as former military medical
officers espousing physicians’ social responsibilities even at the expense of a court
martial, as exemplified in the case of Levy during the Vietnam War (5, 7); Levy served as
a dermatologist in the Army and, on ethical grounds, refused to train Green Beret aid men
on dermatological skills (7). These two authors outline that mixed agency leads to at least
five ethical contraventions against the patient: subordinating patients’ best interests,
overriding patients’ decisions, failure to provide care, and blurring the providers’
noncombatant roles (5). The authors further propose that physicians carry a “special”
responsibility to prevent war and, thus, they support disobeying orders on ethical grounds
(5). After the Vietnam and Cold Wars, a relative paucity of opinion surfaced from
academia. This calm may be attributed to the favorable outcomes and short stints of U.S.
conflict through the 1980-1990’s. After GWOT began, a reawakening occurred within
biomedical experts to address the mixed agency problem and to present a call for patientcentered decision making. Maxwell G. Bloche, a member of Physicians for Human
Rights and a health law bioethicist, frames that the Hippocratic Oath serves as the starting
guidance for all physicians:
In denying their status as physicians, military doctors divert attention from an
urgent moral challenge — the need to manage conflict between the medical
profession’s therapeutic and social purposes. The Hippocratic ethical tradition
offers no road map for resolving this conflict, but it provides a starting point. The
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therapeutic mission is the profession’s primary role and the core of physicians’
professional identity. (8)
George J. Annas, another bioethicist at Boston University, dictates that the concept of a
true “mixed agency” for the military physician serves as a false deviation (9). Annas
exclaims that, under all circumstances, military physicians are a “physician first, last, and
always” (9).Yet, other commentators, such as Peter A. Clark, from Georgetown School of
Medicine, recognize that the military dual loyalty issue reaches its boiling point when
“being placed in the situation as physicians to these detainees….when the world is living
in fear of yet another suicide bomb attack, places these military medical professionals in
a delicate balancing act between loyalty to their patients and loyalty to their country.”
Yet, amidst the new strain of treating rogue terrorists, Clark concludes that the balance
has shifted away from the care of these patients (10).
Against the current backlash of medical experts, military supporters have presented
military-specific rebuttals to the aforementioned commentary. Supporters of military
medical officers, as best apt to handle the loyalty of mission and patient, state that the
qualifications of a military officer best fulfills the needs of the military and the esprit de
corps of the very patients they treat (6). Another validation for the physician-soldier
centers on the service that the military physician does for his or her country (6). William
Madden, a military bioethicist writing to medical students at USUHS, conveys that the
medical officer “is not violating his professional responsibility to relieve pain and
suffering; rather it is being met in a special way” (6). In today’s volunteer military, Howe
illustrates that since individuals “autonomously choose to sacrifice for a greater good”
then patient-soldiers expect that military physicians honor personal sacrifices to win
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conflicts (4). Howe generalizes that military physicians lean towards a patient-centered
practice and the exception occurs when “they encounter the extenuating circumstances
requiring that priorities be given first to military necessity” (11). Also, in regards to
Sidel’s commentary, Dominick R. Rascona responds as a current military physician and
remarks that the role of the medical officer fills a legitimate societal duty during wartime
(12). Medical decisions of the military constitute choosing the “lesser of evils” when
diplomatic relations fail (12). Rascona contends that societies that follow the “just war”
doctrine demand the virtue of duty from its citizens to “serve as soldiers and some
doctors to serve as medical officers; it is only a question of who will subject themselves
to the burden of this service” (12).
Ultimately, the solution between loyalties to the military versus the patient lies in
striking the balance between both parties. Civilian analysts, such as Annas and Sidel,
would most likely disregard an ethical spectrum and support a rigid patient-centered
dogma of medical decision making. Nevertheless, at least currently, the military
physician must have an established framework or he/she “can waylay” to “discover
which master to serve” (13). One approximate strategy involves assessing whether
“military necessity is not absolutely required” and, if not, then to practice patientcentered dynamics (4). For example, during the first Gulf War, military physicians
vaccinated soldiers against Anthrax without consent to serve a high military objective of
preventing mass casualties from the threat of biological weapons; typically, this mass
effect decision rested on commanding officers and high ranking medical officers and not
on the primary providers themselves (4).
In GWOT, military physicians care for allied soldiers and enemy combatants alike.
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Each patient population brings specific scenarios that confront the caregiver with the
theme of mixed agency. A general situation involves a detainee’s right to refuse treatment
as highlighted in a case study by the The Hastings Center:
United States Special Forces capture a combatant in the mountains of Eastern
Afghanistan whom they believe has vital information that would help lead to the
arrest of a major suspected terrorist. He is transferred to a U.S. military hospital at
an undisclosed location. The physicians at the hospital soon discover that he is
suffering from renal failure, and they prepare to provide dialysis. The combatant
refuses, however, stating that he would rather die than live as a prisoner of the
United States. Uncertain how to proceed, the military nephrologist asks her
commanding officer for guidance. The question of whether to override the
prisoner's refusal of treatment is quickly relayed up the military hierarchy. Two
days later, the Secretary of Defense delivers the order to initiate dialysis, despite the
prisoner's refusal. The order cites as justification the pressing national security
interest in keeping the prisoner alive for a thorough interrogation that would lead to
the arrest of an important terrorist suspect. Is the decision the right course of action?
(14)
Regarding enemy detainees, a similar scenario involves military physicians’ managing of
hunger strikes. In order to stop these protests, military physicians enact force feeds (15).
In GWOT, Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba has served as a detention facility since
2002. The ethics of managing hunger strikes of detainees has been publicized (15-17). A
hunger strike defines the voluntary refusal of food in order to achieve a goal or demand
(18). How does the military carry out its policy towards hunger strikes? The following
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excerpt from a medical note cited in the New England Journal of Medicine provides a
glimpse of the established procedures:
Despite being advised that hunger striking is detrimental to his health, the detainee
refuses to eat. Restraints were ordered for medical necessity to facilitate feeding the
detainee. There is no evidence that medications or a medical process is causing this
detainee’s refusal to eat. Detainee does not have any medical condition/disability
that would place him at greater risk during feeding using medical restraints.
Detainee was told that he will remain in restraints until feed and postfeed
observation time (60–120 minutes) is completed. Detainee understands that if he
eats, that involuntary feeding in medical restraints will no longer be required. (19)
Do established ethical guidelines support this sequence of events?
Professional organizations responded to the medical ethics in GWOT. The World
Medical Association (WMA), who the American Medical Association (AMA) is a
signatory member, formed their Declaration of Tokyo in 1975, with an update in 2006, to
address physicians’ participations in torture and their treatment of prisoners as a global
reaction to the atrocities of the Vietnam War (20). The Declaration mandates the
prohibition of torture, either direct or indirect, by medical professionals (20). Examples
of indirect involvement include sharing medical knowledge and observing torture (20).
Also, the WMA dictated that physicians, and not third parties, should have complete
authority over prisoners’ medical care (20). Of note, the WMA addressed hunger strikes
and judged that mentally competent prisoners have the right to refuse food and not be
force fed (20). In 2009, the WMA reaffirmed The Declaration of Tokyo and urged
national medical associations to hold physicians accountable to its instructions (21).
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Along with their affirmation in Tokyo, the WMA published a separate declaration
addressing their position on hunger strikes in 1992 and updated it in 2006 in response to
the Guantanamo hunger strikes. Entitled The Declaration of Malta, the WMA gave a
comprehensive position and favored a patient’s autonomy to refuse nutrition, if, and only
if, the patient is deemed competent and the individual’s decision is voluntary (22). The
Declaration further dictates that physicians should remain objective in their evaluation to
the hunger striker by clearly documenting the informed consent process, physical
findings, and mental competency of the prisoner (20, 22). Also, physicians should
prevent coercion by other detainees or third parties and they should ascertain the patient’s
wishes in written advance directives (22).
In respect to prisoners of war, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 extend the
advancement of humane treatment of all detainees as binding international law. The
Conventions prohibit acts of torture, humiliation, and medical maltreatment towards
prisoners of war (23). In regards to interrogation, prisoners are obligated to “give only
[their] surname, first names and rank, date of birth, serial number, or equivalent
information” and “no physical or mental torture, nor any form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information” (23). Also, the Geneva
Conventions encompass their protections to cover all belligerents until “their status is
determined by a competent tribunal” (23). In regards to medical care, prisoners receive
immediate life saving treatment and triage of mass casualties should follow: “only urgent
medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment administered” (23, 24).
During internment, prisoners obtain access to an infirmary, specialized care, appropriate
nutrition, sufficient hygiene products, and monthly medical checks (23). Whether
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captured insurgents or terrorists warrant prisoner of war status, the Geneva Conventions
afford a blanket of protection amongst all belligerents, regardless of their presumed
status. This protection forms the referenced Common Article 3 which delineates the
humane treatment of all captors, including the prohibition of “cruel treatment” and
“outrages against personal dignity” (25).
Another legal source that guides military physicians is the Uniformed Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) which details punishable offenses that warrant court martial.
Here, Articles 92 and 93 of the UCMJ deal with failure of obeying a lawful order and
cruelty/maltreatment. Failure to obey an order constitutes:
Any person subject to this chapter who—1) violates or fails to obey any lawful
general order or regulation; 2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued
by any member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the
order; or 3) is derelict in the performance of his duties. (26)
Cruelty and maltreatment correspond to: “any person subject to this chapter who is guilty
of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct” (26). Clearly, the Manual forbids abuse of
patients and physicians must follow lawful orders as outlined by the Geneva Conventions
and superior commanding officers.
Lastly, legal precedents through the justice system shed light on how the law
applies in GWOT. One landmark Supreme Court case highlighted the emerging answers
to detainee care in GWOT. The 2006 court case of Hamdan v Rumsfeld tested the
executive branch’s ability to assemble special military tribunals to convict detainees of
war crimes in relation to ties with Al-Qaeda (27). Furthermore, Hamdan v Rumsfeld
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allowed for an initial judgment on whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the
detainees in Guantanamo Bay (27). The Court decided that the Geneva Conventions do
apply to detainees with at least the minimal protections afforded by Common Article 3 of
humane/just treatment and medical care (23, 27). Common Article 3 prefaces with: “In
the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as
a minimum, the following provisions” (23). As Justice John Paul Stevens clarified in his
opinion:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article 3
does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being “‘international
in scope,’” does not qualify as a “‘conflict not of an international character.’” That
reasoning is erroneous. The term “conflict not of an international character” is used
here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations. (27)
The review of applicable legal standards reminds the individual physician to understand
how law has been interpreted. Such an understanding will allow for clearer decision
making during combat towards the treatment of the wounded and the internment of
detainees. Furthermore, the legal review and decisions of the Justice Department serve as
a governing check for Department of Defense policy.
The ethical principles that mold the decision to force feed a patient embroil a
physician’s stewardship to preserve life versus the autonomy of the patient. Regarding
physicians’ personal convictions about the sanctity of life, military commentators
contend that this ethical situation may be irreconcilable (17). The proposed justification
for force feeding correlates hunger strikes as suicide and that all medical efforts are
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permissible to prevent self-harm (17). Furthermore, detainees may suffer psychiatric
disorders, thus blurring a detainees’ competency, and the effect of peer pressure also
confounds the voluntary basis of prison hunger strikes (10, 19). Also, non-medical
explanations dictate that GTMO hunger strikers follow unconventional warfare and that
allowing these deaths will corroborate a military failure with “global consequences” (10).
Currently, the decision to force feed a detainee rests on the detention commander and this
responsibility may free, or at least reduce, the military physician’s moral burden (28).
Opponents, from the academia of health law and bioethics, state that aggressive
action on competent individuals embodies a complete violation of medical ethics (19,
28). This camp contends that the aforementioned behavior takes away the autonomy of
the patient. A counterpoint to a presumed military backlash from fasting deaths rests on
prior suicides at the detention facility in Guantanamo; three suicides by hanging
transpired and no such “risk to global security” has occurred (19). Also, the use of
restraint chairs constitutes an unethical form to administer nutrition (19). As an
exception, Annas concedes that force feeding may be justified in incompetent patients to
serve their best needs but he concludes that most GTMO detainees are not deemed
incompetent or suicidal (19). Also, commentators question that the commanders’ ability
to order force feedings does not free the military physician from carrying out the medical
procedure and, as a consequence, breach medical ethics (10, 19, 28). Dissenters urged
military physicians and leaders to stop force feeding and to follow declarations against
the practice (19). This shift in policy will prevent this mixed agency scenario; a
“physician first” doctrine would make it much less likely that any volatile orders would
be issued in the first place (19).
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Nevertheless, the military currently continues to use force feeding and successfully
reduced the number of hunger to strikes from 164 detainees to only three protesters in
2006 (19, 29). Ultimately, the beneficence to maintain life confronts the patient’s
autonomy over his or her life. The review of military medical ethics, established
guidelines, and expert commentary demonstrates a convincing demand to adhere to a
patient’s right to refuse nutrition. Therefore, when formulating the military’s policy, how
does force feeding competent individuals find its legitimacy? Here, a historical review
and analysis emanates the consequences of domestic penal history on today’s
international military policy. The final aim is to decipher how the United States arrived
with its current hunger strike policy and, furthermore, what avenue of reform needs
attention in this current dilemma of military medicine’s mixed agency. A clear and
widely accepted solution to the issue of hunger strikes will improve military medicine
and its impact on the global reputation of the United States and its military.
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Figure 1. Hippocrates Refuses the Gifts of Artaxerxes, 1792, French. Oil on canvas.
Keeping his allegiance to Greece, Hippocrates refuses gifts by the Persian emissaries to convince
him to aid plagued enemy soldiers.
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This analysis assesses the influence of United States case law history on the
Department of Defense’s policy of managing hunger strikes by enemy combatants. The
author hypothesizes that the case law history of approximately 1979 to 1997 justified a
State’s right to force feed mentally competent prisoners undergoing hunger strikes and
that this series of court decisions enabled the U.S. military’s policy of force feeding
detainees of the Global War on Terror. Secondary aims of the study are to elucidate how
domestic policy influences U.S. military medicine, the relationship of the bioethics
community with military medicine, and possible avenues for advancement in military
medical ethics.
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METHODS
The primary author undertook a comprehensive literature review in history of
military medicine and military medical ethics. The central theme of mixed agency arose
as a source of conflict in many physician scenarios. A review of the current literature
showed that some unprecedented mixed agency situations have occurred in the Global
War on Terror, specifically involving the care of detainees. One such situation is the
managing of prisoner hunger strikes by the United States. The author reviewed the
relevant literature of the hunger strike situation in GWOT using press releases,
government conferences, non-government organization investigations, intra-government
investigations, and ethics commentary. To investigate the origins of hunger strike policy,
the author undertook interdisciplinary research of United States case law history, federal
prison regulations, military regulations, international judicial opinions, international laws,
and established ethics declarations. With the review of the evidence, the primary author
arrived at conclusions of the influence of domestic court history on the military’s hunger
strike doctrine. The manuscript was reviewed by Dr. John H. Warner and Dr. Richard S.
Young and appropriate revisions were included.

NOTE: The opinions and conclusions of this thesis are solely of the primary author and
do not, necessarily, reflect the opinions or views of the United States Government,
Department of Defense, or Department of the Navy.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In addressing the issue of hunger strikes, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs (ASDHA), Dr. William Winkenwerder Jr., simply said in 2006, “There is
a moral question….Do you allow a person to commit suicide? Or do you take steps to
protect their health and preserve their life?” (15)
The United States military pursued the preservation of life of its Guantanamo
detainees at all costs. Indeed, force feeding procedures involve nasogastric tubes and, at
times, restraint chairs (15). A central question to ask is: how did the United States
military arrive at force feeding competent prisoners? Formally, what established and
accepted framework set the stage to force feed prisoners?
Specifically, the ethics of hunger strikes began to emanate in the U.S. Court system
around the 1980’s through the mid 1990’s. This period of domestic law rulings
constructed the starting platform of force feeding prisoners in the United States. A closer
review of the respective court cases will set the further argument that U.S. domestic
policy framed, if not at least influenced, today’s military policy of hunger strikes.
In 1979, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts heard what it considered the
first case addressing a prisoner’s right to refuse life saving treatment. The Court remarked
that the “judge below found that it raised novel and important questions of law” (30) .
Kenneth Myers, a young competent male prisoner, developed kidney failure due to
glomerulonephritis and, as such, the inmate received life-sustaining dialysis. After one
year of treatment, Myers began to refuse dialysis to protest his transfer to a medium level
security prison and to voice his desire to return to the minimum security facility (30). The
court decided, in Commissioner of Correction v Myers, that the State had the right to
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provide treatment without consent because of the “State's interest in upholding orderly
prison administration and [the] evaluation of this interest takes account of the threat
posed to prison order, security, and discipline by a failure to prevent the death of an
inmate who attempts to manipulate his placement within the prison system by refusing
life-saving treatment” (30). Myers’ case outlined the circumstances of when the State can
impose its will on prisoners. In contrast to a previous case in 1977 of a terminal ill and
mentally incompetent patient, in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, Myers’ case demonstrated the importance of the prisoner’s motive and
medical condition to submit to medical intervention. The Court felt that since Myers was
not terminally ill and dialysis proved an immediate life-saving procedure, then the State
possessed a great investment to keep him alive (30).
In the year 1982, three separate court decisions regarding hunger strikes were
handed down in Georgia, New York, and West Virginia. Georgia presented the first
ruling and concluded opposite to Myers. Here, in Zant v Prevatte, Ted Anthony Prevatte
was a death row inmate and underwent a hunger strike so that he may be moved to a
different prison (31). Prevatte argued that his hunger strike was protected under the right
to privacy (31). In contrast, the State of Georgia exclaimed the prison’s desire to preserve
the inmate’s life (31). The Court decided that Prevatte was a “sane and competent”
person and that the State failed to demonstrate evidence to save his life, especially since
Prevatte was on death row (31). Furthermore, the Court exclaimed that prisoners do
retain their right to privacy and that the prison system should not make life and death
decisions (31). In the following years, the Prevatte decision to protect the medical
autonomy of prisoners will join the minority of cases that favor hunger strikers. Three
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months after Prevatte in Georgia, Von Holden v Chapman reverted to justify the force
feeding of mentally competent prisoners (32). Mark D. Chapman, who murdered John
Lennon, initiated a hunger strike with the intention to starve to death and draw attention
to child hunger (32). Chapman explained his hunger strike fell under his right to privacy
and freedom of expression (32). The Supreme Court of New York decided that the right
of privacy does not constitute the right to commit suicide and the prison system is
permitted in restricting individual expression for disciplinary order (32). Of note, Judge
Denman recognized that “the preservation of life has a high social value in our culture”
(32). The previous statement highlights the great psychological block of allowing hunger
strikes in the United States. In West Virginia, White v Narick also ruled in favor of a
prison’s responsibility to preserve a hunger striker’s life (33). Here, the Court also
disagreed with Zant and exclaimed that the Georgia decision disregarded “compelling
civility” against the loss of life and the “manipulative” indiscretions of prisoners (33).
Narick and Chapman demonstrated that despite a precedent case favoring a prisoner’s
autonomy, aligning decisions would be difficult to follow from other jurisdictions.
The remaining cases of the 1980’s struck similar decisions. In 1984, In regards to
Caulk, Joel Caulk was subjected to enteral feeds in the State of New Hampshire. Caulk
was a prisoner serving concurrent sentences and awaited further charges in the State of
California; Caulk’s fate rendered him a prisoner for life (34). Thus, Caulk decided to
starve to death and declared that he was not committing suicide in the following
statement: “Absolutely not. There is a qualitative difference between what I am doing and
suicide. I am allowing myself to die. My life is over. As far as I'm concerned my life has
ended, only the dying remains. It's not an overt act. I'm not killing myself. I'm allowing
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myself to be taken, it’s time” (34). Again, the State argued that the overriding principles
were to preserve life and maintain the integrity of Caulk’s criminal sentence (34). The
State implied that, if the prisoner were allowed to die, then he escapes his full
imprisonment and thus would “frustrat[e]” the criminal justice system (34). The sole
dissenter, Judge J. Douglas, sided with Caulk’s right to privacy and argued that the State
did not prove that fasting was a danger to disciplinary order. For the first time in this
respective case law history, Douglas cited the intrusiveness of enteral feeding via a
nasogastric tube to outline a breach in medical ethics:
No novocaine was used during the insertion of the tube. He suffered a great deal of
pain and discomfort as a result of the constant irritation of the tube on his throat and
nasal passages. His efforts to resist the painful swallowing reflex caused him to
suffer severe headaches. The tube was removed due to the danger of imminent
ulceration of his throat and nasal passages. (34)
Despite Douglas’ siding with a prisoner’s medical right, the judge acknowledged the
severity of the consequences in permitting hunger strikes and, therefore, proposed five
precautionary steps: maintain consistency in prison policies, ascertain the prisoner’s
competency, obtain informed consent, waive any criminal liability of the penitentiary,
and withhold resuscitative efforts (34). Judge Douglas represents another minority
opinion in hunger strike case law. In 1989, Albert Garza, a patient in the United States
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners (MCFP) in Springfield, Missouri underwent a
religious fast according to Sephardic Judaism principles (35). In Garza v Norman, the
prisoner invoked his freedom of religion as legitimacy to refuse food (35). The United
States Circuit Court of the Eight District maintained that religious fasting, within the right
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of free exercise of religion, in a prison setting is not absolute and that the prison system
has a vested interest to preserve the inmate’s life (35).
Before proceeding forward, a diversion into a Supreme Court case in 1987 warrants
a closer look. In Tuner et al. v Safley et al., the Supreme Court reviewed prison
regulations restricting inmate correspondence and marriage (36). The Supreme Court
applied a “reasonable relationship” standard to assess a prison’s regulation on the
infringement of individual rights (36). At this juncture, the Turner decision represented
the first case by the Supreme Court to develop a litmus test on prison policies. The
“reasonable relationship” standard sharply contrasted with the “strict scrutiny”
traditionally applied by the courts towards the infringement of personal liberties (37). The
Court defined a regulation as reasonable if it served a legitimate government purpose and
if other alternatives existed (36). Also, the Supreme Court weighed the prison’s resources
to permit the individual liberty and whether a lack of options justified the regulation (36).
This more lax review of prison regulations cemented the lower court rulings of the
decade and enabled prisons to continue to deter hunger strikes via force feeds into the
1990’s.
At the turn of the decade, the Supreme Court of the United States heard a similar
case regarding prisoners’ rights. In Washington v Harper, Walter Harper began to refuse
psychotropic medications and soon decompensated to become violent and a threat to
others within the prison system (38). Washington argued that the use of a prison medical
committee to determine whether to treat him without consent violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause (38). The Supreme Court ruled against Harper, citing the
landmark case of Turner. Justice Kennedy asserted the usefulness of Tuner, in that, it
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“[applies] in all cases in which a prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the
Constitution, not just those in which the prisoner invokes the First Amendment” (38).
Also, the Court ruled that the medical board contained the appropriate due process
safeguards and the best qualifications for such decisions (38). In the same year,
Pennsylvania decided to pursue force feeding on Joseph Kallinger, who underwent a
hunger strike due to a vision he experienced (39). In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v
Kallinger, the Court cited Harper to validate the force feedings of its prisoners (39).
Following in 1995, Schuetzle v Vogel, the Supreme Court of North Dakota used Turner
and Harper to allow the prison medical system to administer insulin and nutrition to a
non-consenting patient (40). Even recently, in 2003, the Appellate Court of Illinois ruled
to force feed Eldon Millard who underwent a hunger strike due to his facility transfer;
here, the court sided against Millard by applying Turner and similar previous cases (41).
Of note, in Millard’s case, the dissenting Judge Knecht outlined that the State did not
show convincing reasons why “penological interests” are involved (41). Ultimately,
Knecht believed that Millard continued to have the right to refuse treatment (41). Clearly,
the litigation of the 1980’s and 1990’s, with the support of the Supreme Court, cemented
a longstanding deference to the U.S. prison system.
Eleven years after the Zant decision, the State of California judged in 1993 in favor
of a prisoner’s right to hunger strike. The Court affirmed that a competent adult can make
decisions regarding their refusal of medical treatment regardless of the medical
consequences and that the State cannot force such medical treatment unless there is a
clear threat to public safety (42). In Thor v Superior Court, Howard Andrews was a
quadriplegic inmate dependent on medical assistance with his bodily functions, including
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feeding (42). Andrews began to refuse food and medicine and the attending physician
sought authorization to place a feeding tube into Andrews’ stomach (42). In a
revolutionary tone, the court’s opinion described that the refusal of medical treatment
embodied a fundamental right for prisoners and non-prisoners, regardless of status or
motive (42). Unlike the previous cases mentioned, the Thor case opinion effectively cited
the stances of the bioethics community, such as The Hastings Center and the California
Medical Association, to demonstrate that patient autonomy frames the practice of
medicine (42).
In 1996, Singletary v Costello the Florida Court of Appeals weighed the State’s
interests against the prisoner’s right of privacy. The review of the State’s interest
included preservation of life, prevention of suicide, protection of third parties, and the
integrity of the medical profession (43). With the facts of the case, the Court ruled that
the State did not have overriding evidence to overturn the prisoner’s right to refuse
mandatory nutrition (43). As seen, Costello, Zant, and Thor comprised the only three
cases that protected a prisoner’s right to refuse nutritional intervention. In contrast, over a
dozen cases supported the state’s ability to force feed competent prisoners during the
same time period.
Not relating to prisoner hunger strikes, a landmark Supreme Court case in 1990
starkly contrasts its application of patient autonomy in the non-prison world. In Cruzan v
Director, Missouri of Departmental Health, the Court upheld the right of patients to
refuse medical treatment by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (44).
Here, Nancy Cruzan suffered an automobile accident that rendered her in a persistent
vegetative state with no hope of recovery (44). Cruzan’s parents requested to discontinue
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her enteral feeds and assisted medical efforts (44). The Supreme Court ultimately rejected
the parents’ wishes under the pretense that Nancy Cruzan never gave clear directives to
discontinue care if she were in a vegetative state (44). Thus, the Court judged that only
the patient maintains the right to refuse treatment and medical decisions made by others
should rely on the patient’s consent (44). Following in 1997, the Supreme Court upheld
the ban on assisted suicide in Washington v Glucksberg and further reaffirmed the right to
refuse treatment in Cruzan by differentiating this right as explicitly distinct from
physician assisted suicide (45). The cases of Cruzan and Glucksberg demonstrate the
lesser degree of patient autonomy afforded to prisoners (37).
The recorded opinions of military authorities reflect the principles and decisions of
the U.S. Court system. The military implies legal justification in the Joint Task Force
Guantanamo’s motto of “Safe, Humane, Legal, and Transparent” (46). Joint Task Force
(JTF) Guantanamo forms the multi-branch command of the detainee facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The official newspaper for the command, The Wire, contains
numerous instances where command officials defend their doctrine of treating hunger
strikers. In 2005, the Deputy Commander and Senior Medical Officer went on the record
to explain that the responsibility of the detention facility centers on the health of the
prisoners and that enteral feedings are “humane” and “minimally intrusive” (47). This
rationale conforms with the preservation of life doctrine upheld in U.S. Courts and the
acceptance of minimally invasive procedures cited in cases like Myers. In relation to the
use of restraint chairs, JTF officials implied securing prison order from the speculation of
detainees’ “character and temperament” (47). In 2007, another Wire article delineated the
facility’s motives for force feeding. CAPT Ronal L. Sollock, the Joint Medical Group
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commander, expressed that the responsibility of the medical group is the “preservation of
life” and the “unnecessary loss of it” due to hunger strikes (16). Furthermore, the article
cites that the Department of Defense Standard Operating Procedures for detainee hunger
strikes follows the guidelines of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons; here, the
command directly recognizes that U.S. domestic policy towards hungers strikes serves as
formal justification (16).
JTF-Guantanamo takes an effort to assimilate the theme of preservation of life into
their accounts of enteral feedings. Hospital Corpsmen form the equivalent of paramedics
and are trained in the daily operations of feeding hunger strikers. A page in the official
JTF website chronicles the details of force feeding detainees (48). The command asserts
that the feeding procedures are “safe and humane” (48). Furthermore, a description
outlines the definition of hunger strikers and the overall mission towards the preservation
of life:
Detainees are considered hunger strikers if they miss nine consecutive meals and
they demonstrate intent to go on a hunger strike. Once a detainee is considered a
hunger striker, he is closely observed for any deterioration in his health that can be
life threatening. When it is determined his hunger strike has continued to the point
where his health is in jeopardy, an individual nutrition plan is created for each
detainee to ensure each receives the proper nutrients to sustain them safely and
humanely. (48)
Apart from the senior officers of the command, this description demonstrates that the
expressed philosophy to prevent death applies to the lower ranks in the detention center.
In 2006, Dr. William Winkenwerder, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
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Affairs (ASDHA), held a media roundtable with several news organizations to discuss
several detainee health care policies (29). In this interview, Winkenwerder repeatedly
used U.S. domestic legal policy to support military hunger strike procedures.
Winkenwerder stated that the goal of military detention aims to “preserve the life” of the
detainee in accordance with United States law, specifically with Title 28 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (29). Also, when asked about restraint chairs, Winkenwerder
proffered legal arguments that the chairs increase the safety of prison medical staff (29).
Winkenwerder cited the Declaration of Malta to support that resuscitation efforts fall in
line with force feeding hunger strikers (22, 29). This statement by the Assistant Secretary
fails to address that Malta states that such approach should be the exception--when
prisoners have not expressed their desires and that repeated fasts should be respected (22,
29). This omission by Winkenwerder suggests that military policy derives on careful
selection of supportive documents and highlights the importance of the overwhelming
support of U.S. legal precedent. In 2007, Winkenwerder was relieved as ASDHA by Dr.
S. Ward Casscells (46). Casscells, in an article posted in the JTF website, quotes previous
State arguments that “no U.S. law or religion approves of suicide” (46). As shown,
Cascells and Winkenwerder demonstrate a clear Department of Defense reliance on
domestic philosophy framed by the U.S. legal system. As recently as 2009, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) drafted a formal letter to Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates, addressing the ethical stances against force feeding and its contradiction to cases
like Cruzan and Glucksberg (49). In response, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Detainee Affairs, Sandra Hodgkinson, raptly wrote that the military practice of hunger
strikes follows the Federal Bureau of Prisons and with U.S. legal standards (50).
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Apart from the official viewpoints from government officials, the published hunger
strike policies between the domestic and military are similar in principle and wording.
The United States Bureau of Prisons, an agency under the Department of Justice, updated
its policy on hunger strikes in January 15, 2005. In their Program Statement, entitled
Hunger Strikes, the purpose section obligates the prison administration to “preserve life”
(51). The policy defines a hunger strike as a refusal of food of 72 hours with or without
the inmate’s explicit declaration of engaging in one (51). This definition matches the
corpsman’s description of missing nine consecutive meals by GTMO hunger strikers
(48). Hunger Strikes cites the language of Title 28 Part 549 as the guiding source for
outlining initial medical referrals, psychiatric evaluations, inform consent procedures, and
involuntary feedings (51). Also, protesting inmates transfer to a single person cell, lose
commissary privileges, and receive three meals a day (51). In comparison, in 2006,
William Winkenwerder released a Department of Defense Instruction, entitled Medical
Support for Detainee Operations, to outline the principles of managing hunger strikes.
The procedures constitute close similarities with the Bureau of Prison mission to prevent
death with involuntary treatment (52). Also, like the domestic policy, inmates undergo
mental and health evaluations and receive thorough informed consent discussions (52).
Of importance, the Instruction orders detention facilities, such as JTF-Guantanamo, that
their hunger strike policies “shall be developed with consideration of procedures
established by Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 549” (52). The American Civil
Liberties Union, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), obtained a specific
command Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) from the Bagram Theater Internment
Facility, in Afghanistan. The SOP outlines the same definitions and procedures as
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Winkenwerder’s instruction and adds certain medical criteria for the initiation of
involuntary force feeding (53). Military physicians are instructed to consider enteral
feeding when they observe signs of organ damage, fasting patients with pre-existing
conditions, prolonged fasts of more than 21 days, weights less than 85% of ideal body
weight, or reductions of 15% of original weights (53). Furthermore, similar to the U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, the SOP outlines other alternatives such as intravenous
hyperalimentation or placing a gastronomy tube as last resorts (51, 53). Also, both
institutions implement authorization checks on medical personnel through the
requirement to have commanding officer or warden/court authorization, respectively (51,
53). None of these institutions’ publications consider in writing the prevailing stance of
the ethics community against involuntary treatment of competent individuals, thus,
suggesting their heavy reliance on U.S. case law precedence (51, 53).
Outside of the United States, the international community demonstrated examples
where case law upheld a prisoner’s right to refuse treatment. The review of these cases
implies that the medical legal system, by at least through court cases, has an impact on
patients’ rights. In 1995, the United Kingdom recognized patient autonomy in Secretary
of State for the Home Department v Robb (54). Here, the High Court reasoned that since
the prisoner undergoing the hunger strike was of “sound mind” and that he understood
the consequences of his fast then the prison system did not possess the authority to force
feed him (54); this ruling upheld British law and set the same medical standard amongst
civilians and prisoners (37). Since the British ruling, there have been two prison deaths
from hunger strikes in the United Kingdom involving Gary Bland and Barry Horne, in
1996 and 2001 respectively (55). Bland was a former murderer and Horne was an animal
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rights activist (55). The fact that, since 1995, two UK hunger strike deaths occurred,
suggests that few prisoners will culminate a fast with their personal demise.
Subsequently, other global rulings supporting prisoners emerged. For example, in 2005,
the Human Rights Court in Ukraine upheld the right to refuse nutrition; the Court
rationalized that the prison system did not show compelling evidence of medical
necessity to initiate feedings and cited Common Article 3 and the WMA’s Declaration of
Tokyo as standings towards ruling in favor of the prisoner (56). Unlike the majority of the
U.S. cases, here, in the case of Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, the court uses established
bioethics in deciphering their opinion (56). Following in 2006, a United Nations Tribunal
reviewed a case from the Netherlands involving a Serbian prisoner’s hunger strike. In
Prosecutor v Vojislav Seselj, the Tribunal ordered the Dutch government to pursue
medical care of the detainee “to the extent that such services are not contrary to
compelling internationally accepted standards of medical ethics or binding rules of
international law” (57). Also, the Tribunal requested the Dutch to update their citations of
medical ethics to include the updated Declaration of Malta of 2006 which irrevocably
rules out force feeding (57). The international cases of Nevmerzhitsky and Seselj
demonstrate that the international community has acknowledged a prisoner’s medical
autonomy recently.
Apart from international court cases, the United Nations independently reviewed
the medical ethics of JTF-Guantanamo. In the Commission of Human Right’s Situation
of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Commission concluded that the internment
procedures were in violation of medical ethics and the “right to health” (58); also, of
note, the review noted that the U.S. court cases failed to regard relevant mandates (59).
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The Commission recommended that the United States stop force feeding competent
detainees (58). Also, the Commission encouraged the reform of U.S. policy to conform to
the United Nations’ Principles of Medical Ethics in which it specifically prohibits the use
of restraining procedures (58, 59). In 1998, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) posted their stance on force feeding aligning with the WMA’s declarations (60).
Here, the ICRC stresses that an open patient-physician relationship would allow for
effective informed consent; furthermore, physicians should not subject prisoners to
coercion (60). In an interview in Harper’s Magazine, the ICRC was documented to
disagree with the U.S. military’s policy (61). The senior medical advisor, Dr. Paul
Bouvier, spoke to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and he relayed
that the ICRC does not support the force feeding of prisoners (61).
The overarching connection between the U.S. military and the justice department
reached a stronger consensus when, in 2009, the United States District Court of the
District of Columbia heard the first case involving hunger strikes in GTMO (62). Here,
United States District Judge, Gladys Kessler, ruled in favor of the Government. In AlAdahi v Obama, Mohammad Ali Abdullah Bawazir and others filed for an Emergency
Motion for Injunction to stop the use of restraint chairs during enteral feeds; the plaintiffs
urged that the application of restraint chairs equaled torture (62). Kessler denied the
injunction and allowed military medical personnel to continue force feeds and use
restraint chairs as they seemed necessary (62). Citing legal precedence, Kessler decided
that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over aspects of detention operations in
Guantanamo and, even if it held such right, she rationalized that prior U.S. cases such as
Turner substantiated the practice of force feeding and the use of restraint chairs, when
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necessary (62). The case of Al-Adahi v Obama conclusively links the unforeseen
consequence of 1979-1997 case law: extending domestic doctrine into the treatment of
prisoners of GWOT.
Amidst the criticism of the military’s hunger strike practices, the groundwork began
almost 30 years ago within the United States. Even though hunger strikes have been a
form of protest throughout history, the jurisdiction of the 1980’s and 1990’s reflected
American ideology that the preservation of life and the State’s interests can upend a
prisoner’s right of privacy, in this case medical autonomy. Since the Global War on
Terror began after September 11, 2001, the United States military could have formulated
their mandates on published medical opinions and international laws. Furthermore, key
foreign entities, such as the United Kingdom, enacted and upheld a patient’s right to
refuse nutrition regardless of a citizen’s status. Therefore, the only legitimate backing for
the United States Department of Defense lies in the United States legal system
corroborated by the case law history of the State, District, and Supreme Courts. Another
controversial military policy, such as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT), has been
supported and rejected by the justice system using Supreme Court decisions on sodomy
laws such as Bowers v Hardwick and Lawrence v Texas (63, 64). The DADT issue
exemplifies another instance where domestic case law affects military policy, albeit in a
non-medical context, and further underscores this relationship in regards to hunger
strikes.
The unintended consequences of hunger strike case law on international detainees
beg the question of how we could have arrived at a different current outcome. Perhaps,
the U.S. court system, during its time, did not fully involve the bioethics community in
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assessing each case of prisoner hunger strikes. At the very least, the court system could
have referenced with more stature the published stances on hunger strikes. The Geneva
Conventions, the Declaration of Tokyo, the Declaration of Malta, and the UN’s
Principles of Medical Ethics constitute some of these resources. Thus, if the court system
ignored, or, at the most, perused medical ethics, then the authoritative weight of medical
associations, global bodies, and international law comes into question.
Then, does the obstinate resistance of the U.S. military on hunger strikes suggest
that medical ethics should consider a separate framework for military physicians? How
can military physicians free themselves from breaching their moral compass of medical
practice while fulfilling requirements of military necessity? A simplistic solution requires
physicians to defer to the institution during mixed agency situations. In the case of
national prisons, the United States has concluded that patient autonomy does not stand as
an absolute right and that penitentiary order and discipline constitute lofty priorities.
Military prisons share such priorities with the added responsibility of national security.
JTF-Guantanamo performs interrogation operations on its detainees and, one may
suggest, that death from successful fasts undermines this national goal. The Office of
National Intelligence published several thwarted terrorist plots from information
collected through detainee interrogations (65). Therefore, a possible solution forces the
bioethics community to uphold, or at least recognize, the validity of an institution’s
agenda-- a prison’s interest to keep competent, healthy inmates alive and the military’s
objective to keep America secure.
Alternatively, how does the chronicled effect of U.S. medical law history into
foreign military policy illuminate the best way towards patient-centered reform? As a
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broad and starting platform, undergraduate and graduate medical education should
emphasize a thorough discussion of military medical ethics and mixed agency conflicts.
This investment would place future well-versed civilian and military physicians to
discuss and improve military medical ethics. In 1994, as an Army doctor, Brian Carter,
conducted an intra-service survey to ascertain ethical concerns by Army physicians
deployed in Desert Storm (66). Sizable groups of respondents disagreed with certain
tenets of detainee care outlined by the Geneva Conventions (66). In 2007, motivated by
the ethics of GWOT, J. Wesley Boyd and fellow peers surveyed about 5,000 medical
students from various institutions and demonstrated that the majority of respondents
received less than one hour of ethics instruction in military medicine and few students
were familiar with mandates of the Geneva Conventions (67). These objective studies
and sobering findings call for further exploration of military medical ethics throughout
the training pipeline.
Externally, many commentators and human rights organizations believe that the
United States military should involve independent bioethicists and policy planners in
constructing medical guidelines surrounding mixed agency issues (10, 18, 28, 68, 69);
clearly, this approach demands consideration and the Department of Defense credits
referencing the civilian medical world for input (29, 70). Yet, this approach has failed to
a degree, since amidst the rhetoric, current policy still condones force feeding with the
backing of domestic health law. Here, then, one must conclude that effective action for
reform would originate from harder authoritative sources. Congressional legislation from
either the state or federal levels would begin to change the national landscape of
upholding a competent prisoner’s right to refuse medical treatment. Therefore, health
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law, human rights, and ethics activists should target their concerted efforts to all branches
of government. A pressing voice would initiate greater discussion within public officials
and the American people. If the United States desires to advance the field of medical
ethics and, ultimately, one of the mixed agency scenarios of military physicians, then a
change in domestic policy should be reanalyzed and reformed. With this goal of change,
the State, physicians, and the general public would have to restrain their pride and view
all prisoners as patients first. This prolonged misperception of prisoners serves as the
initial barrier in reform as reflected in The King’s Threshold by W. B. Yeats during
Ireland’s early 20th century hunger strikes:
He has chosen death:
Refusing to eat or drink, that he may bring
Disgrace upon me; for there is a custom,
An old and foolish custom, that if a man
Be wronged, or think that he is wronged, and starve
Upon another's threshold till he die,
The common people, for all time to come,
Will raise a heavy cry against that threshold,
Even though it be the King's. (71)
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